Présentation de l'éditeur
The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.
Stefano Bertea is a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft research fellow at the Goethe Universität and an Associate Professor at the University of Leicester.
Sommaire
Introduction
1. The concept of obligation
2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map
3. The social-practice account
4. The interpretivist account
5. The conventionalist reason account
6. The exclusionary reason account
7. A revisionary Kantian conception
8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception
9. The robust reason account
10. The method of presuppositional interpretation
Conclusion
