Présentation de l’éditeur

In the philosophy of law there has been a proliferation of advanced work in the last thirty years on the normativity of law. Recent theories explore law's character as a special kind of convention, shared cooperative activity, and social artifact, among other perspectives, to explain the precise way in which law provides subjects with reasons for action. Yet, for all their sophistication, such accounts fail to deliver on their promise, which is to establish how law creates more than just legal reasons for action. This Element aims to survey these views and others, situate them in a broader context of theories about the nature of law, and subsequently suggest a path forward based on the methodological continuity between analytical, evaluative, and empirical approaches to law's normativity.

Sommaire

Introduction

Part I

1 The Moral Normativity of Law: Aristotle, Aquinas, Finnis

2 Classical Legal Positivism: Hobbes, Bentham, Austin

3 Twentieth-Century Positivism: Kelsen and Hart

4 Twentieth-Century Positivism: Raz

Part II

5 “Third” Theories of Law

6 Social Facts and the Normativity of Law

7 Coercion and Law’s Normativity

Part III

8 Observations and Lessons

9 Future Directions

Conclusion